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ABSTRACT
The scarlet letter of the term “troll” has long been affixed to the lapel of businesses within the patent
context. This pejorative term, however, has had little relevance or widespread public recognition within
the domain of copyright law until 2010. Since the awakening of the “copyright troll,” several non-author
rights holders have recently adopted and propagated a substantially modified version of this sue-to-settle
paradigm within the context of copyright law while introducing it to the scale of mass-litigation. Further,
the amorphous term “copyright troll” traditionally characterizes a business practice of acquiring
unenforced copyrights that are being infringed upon through various online media vehicles while
monetizing the fundamental disconnect between the current copyright law and Internet users’ behavioral
norms. Without typically authoring original works of expression, these businesses seek to extract rapid
settlements from a nexus of antiquated intellectual property laws while chilling free speech and
disincentivizing innovation. As a result of creative manipulation, both the original policy-backed
intentions instilled by the Framers within the 1976 Act and the delicate balance between hyper- and
hypo-enforcement have been patently disrupted. Moreover, the ramifications of “troll” litigation tactics
have ensnared countless innocent users into costly litigation and settling unwarranted claims to avoid
being perpetually associated with the illegal activity of online copyright infringement. As the scope of
online copyright infringement continues to exponentially expand, this legal uncertainty acts as a catalyst
for those willing to probe the outskirts of the Act. This comment focuses on three specific businesses
publicly labeled as “copyright trolls,” details their evolution from hyperlinking to peer-to-peer file-sharing,
and analyzes the current state of copyright law in the realm of the digital marketplace.
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LAWLESSNESS?
LUKE S. CURRAN*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine yourself in 2010. You are casually enjoying a coffee while surfing your
preferred online news sources for the latest newsworthy article on a topic that
interests you. Suddenly, you locate an article that piques your interest and you
decide to share it online through your website, blog, social network, or with any
discourse community of your choice. Through any one of these media vehicles, you
choose to directly quote a portion of the story and include a hyperlink to the news
article so others may read it in full. Regardless of the medium used to share the
content, like countless Internet users, you could potentially find a settlement letter in
your mailbox claiming that you infringed upon a copyright, which is punishable up to
$150,000 in statutory damages.1
Take yourself to present day. Perform a standard Internet search of your
favorite television series or movie and include the phrase “watch online free.” In
seconds, you will be able to stream or download almost any film or TV series online
without paying a noncommercial use levy. You will be practicing the most basic form
of online copyright infringement, along with thousands of other Internet users on a
daily basis.2 As a result, the next time you step outside to check your mailbox, you
may find a settlement letter pressuring you to pay several thousand dollars in order
to avoid costly litigation in federal court.3
* © Luke S. Curran 2013. J.D. Candidate, January 2015, The John Marshall Law School.
B.F.A. in Electronic Media, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio. I would like to personally
thank the staff of The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law for their invaluable
editorial assistance and direction. Further, I would like to specifically express my gratitude to Alan
Cooper for providing inspiration and creative guidance in preparing this comment. Any mistakes
found in this article are my own.
1 Remedies for Infringement: Damages and Profits, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012).
2 See David Price, Technical Report: An Estimate of Infringing Use of the Internet, ENVISIONAL
2
(Jan.
2011),
http://documents.envisional.com/docs/Envisional-Internet_Usage-Jan2011.pdf
(approximating that BitTorrent accounted for nearly half of the 23.8% of global Internet that
infringed in 2009). BitTorrent represented 11.4% of global Internet traffic, cyberlocker traffic
accounted for 5.1% of infringing traffic, video streaming sites accounted for 1.4%, and other P2P filesharing networks were responsible for the remainder. Id. at 2–3.
3 Letter from Paul Duffy, Attorney & Counselor at Law, Duffy Law Grp. (Apr. 18, 2013),
available at http://fightcopyrighttrolls.com/2013/04/23/lw-system-v-hubbard-from-adam-urbanczykssigned-agreed-order-to-the-new-breed-of-demand-letters/comment-page-1/ [hereinafter Duffy Law
Letter] (stating that the Paul Duffy Firm is authorized to accept the sum of $2,400 as full settlement
for the client’s infringement claims); Letter from Paul Duffy, Attorney & Counselor at Law, Prenda
Law Inc. (Nov. 2012), http://www.scribd.com/doc/113957135/Prenda (claiming within the settlement
letter that an alleged infringer ignored the settlement and the Northern District of Illinois entered a
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Recently, several businesses have been publicly branded as “copyright trolls,”
including companies such as Righthaven,4 Prenda Law,5 and Malibu Media.6 The
amorphous term “copyright troll” has been traditionally defined in legal publications
and the national media as “a non-producer who merely has acquired the right to
bring lawsuits against alleged infringers” and threatens to file copyright
infringement claims in order to induce rapid settlements against large groups of
anonymous defendants without the intention of proceeding to trial on the merits.7
Furthermore, these companies have commenced an influx of litigation based upon
the claim that reposting a news article or allegedly downloading online content is a
form of copyright infringement.8 This can potentially transform the average
“cybernaut[]” into a “grand larcenist”9 among a “nation of constant infringers,”10
because on a typical day, “even the most law-abiding American engages in thousands
judgment of $1.5 million against him); Letter from Mike Meier, Attorney, Copyright Law Grp. (Jan.
12, 2012), http://dietrolldie.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/clg_settlement_ltr_01833.pdf (offering to
settle an infringement claim for $2,500 for downloading Plaintiff’s copyrighted adult film); Letter
from Paul Lesko, Attorney at Law, Simmons Browder Gianaris Angelides & Barnerd LLC (June
2013), http://dietrolldie.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/lesko_settleltr_02501il.pdf (seeking a $4,000
settlement to avoid prosecution for online copyright infringement).
4 See, e.g., Eva Galperin, EFF Seeks to Help Righthaven Defendants, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.
(Aug. 25, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/08/eff-seeks-righthaven-defendants (labeling
Righthaven a copyright troll for filing hundreds of online copyright infringement suits yearly for the
sole purpose of pressured settlement through the threat of statutory damages awards).
5 See, e.g., Kurt Opsahl, EFF to Represent Bloggers Against Copyright Troll, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Mar. 11, 2013), https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-represent-bloggers-against-copyrighttroll. Prenda Law was named a “copyright troll” due to tactics that include “targeting large groups
of anonymous ‘John Doe’ defendants for downloading files on BitTorrent, seeking their identities,
and exploiting the massive damages in copyright law in order to pressure defendants into settling
quickly.” Id.
6 Malibu Media Lawsuit, PIETZ LAW FIRM, http://pietzlawfirm.com/copyright/malibu-medialawsuit/ (last updated Jan. 4, 2013). The Pietz Law Firm has publicly labeled Malibu Media as a
copyright trolling company and represents John Doe defendants in the Eastern District of Michigan,
the Northern District of Illinois, the District of the District of Columbia, the Eastern District of
California, and the Southern District of California. Id.
7 Malibu Media, LLC v. Does, No. 12-2078, 2013 WL 3038025, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. June 18, 2013)
(emphasizing that a copyright troll is traditionally defined as a non-producer who has acquired the
right to bring lawsuits against alleged copyright infringers); see also Order Issuing Sanctions at 5,
Ingenuity 13, LLC, v. John Doe, No. 2:12-cv-8333-ODW(JCx) (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2013) [hereinafter
Ingenuity Sanctions Order] (stating that a particular copyright troll exploited copyright law by
accusing individuals of illegally downloading a protected work, offering to settle the claim for a
calculated cost just below “the cost of a bare-bones defense,” and forcing the alleged infringers to
settle in order to avoid a “paralyzing social stigma”).
8 See, e.g., Michael Masnick, Just Under 100,000 Sued In Mass Copyright Infringement Suits
Since Start of 2010, TECHDIRT (Jan. 31, 2011, 8:40 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110129/
23354512882/just-under-100000-sued-mass-copyright-infringement-suits-since-start-2010.shtml
(emphasizing that between January 1, 2010 and January 31, 2011, 99,924 “John Does” have been
sued for online copyright infringement).
9 John Tehranian, Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 538, 539
(2007). Professor Tehranian stresses that heavy Internet users or cybernauts’ “ease of digital
reproduction has enabled piracy on a scale never before witnessed in human history” while
identifying a “fundamental disconnect between our copyright laws and our copyright norms [that]
has grown increasingly apparent and has highlighted the need for reform.” Id. at 538, 543.
10 Id. at 543.
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of actions that likely constitute copyright infringement.”11 The objective of copyright
law is to create public benefits by “promot[ing] the Progress of Science” through the
creation and publication of free expression.12 According to the U.S. Supreme Court,
copyright law is designed to “create incentives for creative effort.”13 Conversely, this
law also creates a latent financial incentive for entrepreneurs to monetize a protected
work that is being allegedly infringed by engaging in large-scale litigation, even
when the harm experienced by the rights holder is nominal.
Further, viewing copyright law in the realm of the Internet, this technology can
be bifurcated into a “dual purpose,” which grants users the choice between infringing
and utilizing the Internet for its “perfectly lawful and socially desirable uses.”14 This
legal partition raises the central issue: whether the companies publicly stigmatized
as “copyright trolls” are defending creative rights or turning online piracy into an
extortionate mass-litigation business model in the epoch of statutory damages.
Part I of this comment will briefly provide background on the relevant copyright
law and outline the recent precedent established by two landmark copyright troll
companies. Part II will examine the progression of the copyright troll business model
against its effects on digital rights in the sphere of Internet lawlessness. Part III will
survey several solutions and propose a substantial revision to the existing approach
to regulating this form of mass-litigation leading to pressured settlements. Part IV
sets forth a brief conclusion stressing the importance of closing the divide separating
online users’ behavioral norms and the protections afforded to copyright owners in
order to manifest a careful balance between the interests of authors and the interest
of the audience.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Copyright Act of 1976
As mentioned in the Introduction, the United States Constitution empowers
Congress with the authority “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
11 Id. at 543 (observing that “widespread use of peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing technology,
which has enabled ordinary Americans to become mass copyright infringers with spectacular ease,
has brought the law/norm gap to light”).
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (noting that
constitutional framers intended copyright itself to be the “engine of free expression,” and in creating
a “marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to
create and disseminate ideas”).
13 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984) (viewing
copyright use through its effect upon the potential market for or value of the work in a commercial
setting).
14 Jane C. Ginsburg, Separating the Sony Sheep From the Grokster Goats:
Reckoning the
Future Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent Technology Entrepreneurs, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 578–
79 (2008) (referring to technology as intrinsically neutral in a business setting because it is not
“inherently pernicious” and can be employed for perfectly lawful purposes). The article raises the
issue of whether society can reach a “happy medium” and foster both authorship by enforcing
copyrights while promoting technological innovation. Id. at 579.
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securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
This excerpt of the Constitution is
respective Writings and Discoveries.”15
historically recognized as the “Intellectual Property Clause.”16 The Copyright Act of
1976 (“Copyright Act”) regulates copyrighted works,17 and safeguards “original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,”18 which includes but is not
limited to literary works and motion pictures.19 These protections grant rights
holders a bundle of exclusive rights, including the right to create reproductions,
derivative works, and distributions of the copyrighted work.20 Infringement claims
can be successfully brought against “anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights
of the copyright owner,”21 unless the infringer has a valid defense.22
The Copyright Act also affords rights holders two options for remedies in the
event there is an infringement on any of the owner’s exclusive rights.23 The
copyright owner may elect to recover either: 1) actual damages resulting from the
infringement, which are accompanied by any profits gained by the violator that are
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (noting that courts
refer to this constitutional provision as the intellectual property clause due to the protections it
affords to creative works).
17 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
18 17 U.S.C. § 101. The statute states:
15
16

A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a
copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of
sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this
title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.
Id.

19 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (indicating that works of authorship include the following: “(1) literary
works; (2) musical works . . . ; (3) dramatic works . . . ; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5)
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound
recordings; and (8) architectural works”).
20 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–122 (covering limitations on exclusive rights and scope of exclusive rights).
The Copyright Act states:

[A] “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as
a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative
work.”
17 U.S.C. § 101.
21 17 U.S.C. § 501 (stating that “the legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a
copyright is entitled, subject to the requirements of section 411 [17 USCS § 411], to institute an
action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it”).
22 17 U.S.C. § 107 (noting that fair use is an affirmative defense to a copyright infringement
suit that allows the use of a copyrighted work by a person other than the rights holder for “purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research”).
23 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012).
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attributable to the infringement; or 2) statutory damages.24 Statutory damages are
typically within the range of $750 to $30,000 as the court considers just.25
Conversely, if the rights owner establishes the burden of proving that the infringer
acted willfully,26 the court in its discretion may increase the damages award up to
$150,000.27 The “legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright”
can sue for copyright infringement.28
B. Vexatious Litigation: Awakening the Copyright Troll
The Copyright Act has adopted an acutely protective approach enabling
copyright holders to “preserve or capture a large proportion of the economic rents
generated by their intellectual property.”29 As a result, online copyright trolls
creatively exploit copyright safeguards by employing a profit-based model for
litigation in order to “maximize the economic profits that result from their
exclusivity”30 while completely disregarding the fundamental copyright protections
for any other purpose.31 Mirroring the patent trolls’ modus operandi,32 copyright
trolls procure an expansive range of copyrights that are being infringed and find
large groups of alleged third party-infringers.33 They then pressure such alleged
infringers into settlement through the threat of statutory damages. They do not send
17 U.S.C. § 504.
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).
26 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). But, “[i]n a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving,
and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her
acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of
statutory damages.” Id.
27 Id.
28 Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 884 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also 17
U.S.C. 501(b).
29 Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and Patent Trolls:
The Divergent
Evolution of Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 689, 690 (2006); see also Viva R. Moffat,
Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual Property
Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1493 (2004) (noting that “copyright protection has only
expanded over time and that trend is likely to continue or even accelerate”).
30 Thomas supra note 29, at 693 (emphasizing that intellectual property law “also induces rentseeking behavior” as copyright holders take steps to increase profits by pursuing legal strategies
that maximize intellectual property related revenues).
31 See id. at 692–93 (explaining that patent trolls are “nonproductive patent consolidators who
acquire patents allegedly for the purpose of extorting a substantial settlement or judgment from
productive companies”).
32 James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function
of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 189–90 (2006) (defining a patent troll as a
person or entity who acquires ownership of a patent “without the intention of actually using it to
produce a product”). The patent troll then either “licenses the technology to a person or entity that
will incorporate the patent into a product, or it sues a person believed to already have incorporated
the technology in a product without permission. . . . Critics argue that patent trolls do not promote
innovation and are causing excessive, baseless litigation.” Id.
33 First Amended Complaint for Copyright Infringement at 1, Voltage Pictures, LLC v.
Vasquez, No. 1:10-cv-00873 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2011), ECF No. 143-1. Voltage Pictures filed a
copyright infringement suit against 24,595 defendants for illegally distributing the movie “The Hurt
Locker.” Id.
24
25
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cease and desist letters to the accused individuals, nor do they send Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) takedown notices to Internet Service Providers
(“ISPs”).34 Notably, the general public has recently affixed the scarlet letter of the
copyright troll to the lapel of three companies with mass-litigation business models.
C. Righthaven LLC, The Hyperlink Trolling Firm
Steve Gibson founded Righthaven LLC on January 14, 2010.35 A Las Vegasbased lawyer and the company’s Chief Executive Officer,36 Gibson sought to “take
advantage of copyright’s draconian damages in order to bully Internet users into
forking over money” and website domain names.37 The company would seek out
various newspapers that owned the copyrights to articles that were being reposted or
referenced online by readers, primarily the Las Vegas Review-Journal (“LVR-J”), and
send settlement letters to the hyperlinkers.38 These letters used the threat of
statutory damages as a fulcrum to pressure these readers into settlement for
approximately $2,000–$5,000.39 Strategically, this settlement range is substantially
less than the costs incurred by litigating a copyright infringement suit and is
accompanied by the benefit of precluding the possibility of losing the suit.40 By 2011,
Righthaven demonstrated its initial success by filing 276 copyright infringement
suits, which accrued approximately $352,500 in money settlements based on 141
cases.41
34 See Richard Esguerra, Righthaven’s Brand of Copyright Trolling, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.
(Sept. 2, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/09/righthavens-own-brand-copyright-trolling
(observing that traditionally, copyright holders send cease and desist letters to allow the website
operator or targeted user to remove the infringing content instead of filing a lawsuit without
warning); 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), (g) (2012) (providing the alleged infringer with notice of the copyright
violation places limitations on liability relating to material online).
35 Incorporation
information
for
Righthaven,
LLC,
NEV.
SECRETARY
ST.,
http://nvsos.gov/sosentitysearch/CorpSearch.aspx (search “Righthaven” under entity name, select
“Righthaven LLC” hyperlink); see also John P. Pullen, Las Vegas’s Copyright Crapshoot Could Maim
Social Media, FORTUNE (Jan. 6, 2011), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2011/01/06/las-vegass-copyrightcrapshoot-could-maim-social-media/. Righthaven is owned by two entities: Net Sortie Systems, a
limited liability company owned by Steve Gibson, and SI Content Monitor, which is owned by the
same group that owns the Las Vegas Review-Journal. Id.
36 Pullen, supra note 35.
37 See Esguerra supra note 34 (referring to the maximum statutory damages award and
requests to transfer rights to defendants’ domain names); Righthaven, LLC v. DiBiase, No. 2:10-cv01343-RLH-PAL, 2011 WL 1458778, at *5 (D. Nev. Apr. 15, 2011) (observing that “Congress has
never expressly granted plaintiffs in copyright infringement cases the right to seize control over the
defendant’s website domain”).
38 See Esguerra, supra note 34 (noting that Righthaven’s strategic formula of bringing several
hundred lawsuits in Nevada federal court on behalf of newspaper publishers and alleging copyright
infringement).
39 See Galperin, supra note 4.
40 See Opsahl, supra note 5 (observing that by filing a large volume of minor infringement
claims against out-of-state defendants, Righthaven places the defendants in a situation where
litigating the copyright suit exceeds the value of the disputed claims).
41 Welcome
to
Righthaven
Lawsuits,
RIGHTHAVEN
LAWSUITS,
http://www.righthavenlawsuits.com (last visited Oct. 5, 2013). Righthaven Lawsuits documents a
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However, this sue-first strategy was abruptly halted with Righthaven LLC v.
Democratic Underground, LLC, due to the pivotal contention over “standing to bring
[suit].”42 Although Righthaven previously overcame similar attacks including
personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction as seen in Righthaven LLC v.
Majorwager.com,43 the Democratic Underground (“DU”) case represented the
beginning of Righthaven’s fall towards insolvency.44 In that case, Righthaven filed
an infringement suit against DU for a post on its website containing an excerpt from
a LVR-J article accompanied by a link to the full article.45 On June 14, 2011, the
U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada dismissed Righthaven’s case in its
entirety based upon the procedural dispute of subject-matter jurisdiction and lack of
standing, which ultimately dismantled Righthaven’s business model.46 The court
reasoned that since Righthaven was the assignee of the copyright in question under a

comprehensive catalogue of cases filed by Righthaven LLC. Id. The website conservatively
estimates the total settlement figure based on an educated calculation of an average of $2,500 per
case settled. Id.; see also Michael Masnick, Righthaven Copyrights “Sold” Back to Stephens Media
(Mar.
18,
2013,
7:39AM),
for
$80k
To
Pay
Legal
Fees,
TECHDIRT
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130316/02363422348/righthaven-copyrights-sold-back-tostephens-media-80k-to-pay-legal-fees.shtml.
42 Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground, LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972 (D. Nev. 2011).
The court addresses the Strategic Alliance Agreement and the question of Righthaven’s standing to
pursue the copyright infringement claim because “the right to sue is not one of the exclusive rights,
transfer solely of the right to sue does not confer standing on the assignee.” Id. at 972–73.
Pursuant to Section 501(b) of the Copyright Act, “only the legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive
right under copyright law is entitled, or has standing, to sue for infringement.” Id. (citing Silvers v.
Sony Pictures Entm’t., 402 F.3d 881, 884 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs
Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971, 980 (2d Cir. 1991) (saying that “the Copyright Act does not permit
copyright holders to choose third parties to bring suits on their behalf.”).
43 Righthaven, LLC v. Majorwager.com, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-00484-GMN, 2010 WL 4386499, at
*5 (D. Nev. Oct. 28, 2010). In a number of cases, the courts found that the court has personal
jurisdiction over defendants when that the infringement occurred in the United States, the
copyright was registered in the United States, and the defendant(s) have not overcome the
presumption of reasonableness. See Righthaven, LLC v. Mostofi, No. 2:10-CV-01066-KJD-GWF,
2011 WL 1098971, at *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 22, 2011); Righthaven, LLC v. Indus. Wind Action Corp., No.
210-CV-00601-RLH-PAL, 2010 WL 3829411, at *1 (D. Nev. Sept. 24, 2010); Righthaven, LLC v. Vote
for the Worst, LLC, No. 2:10-CV-01045-KJD, 2011 WL 1304463, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 30, 2011).
44 Plaintiff Righhaven LLC’s Motion for Stay of Judgment Pending Appeal Pursuant to Fed. R.
of App. P. 8(a) at 14–15, Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (D. Nev. June 20, 2011),
available at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2011/09/righthavenbankruptcy.pdf. The
Motion states that judgment enforcement efforts to seize and liquidate assets directed at
Righthaven during a pending appeal would “strike at the very foundation of the company and would
likely force Righthaven to seek bankruptcy protection.”
45 Democratic Underground, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 971.
DU hosts a news website allowing
Internet users to freely post comments about news articles and permits users to post hyperlinks to
other websites. Id. In that case, a user posted a link to a full article on DU’s website that included a
portion of a LVR-J article about Nevada politics and the Tea Party effect on Sharon Angle’s
senatorial campaign. Id.
46 Id. at 971–72 (Righthaven formed a Strategic Alliance Agreement with LVR-J, which
granted Righthaven an exclusive license to exploit “[a]ssigned Copyrights for any lawful purpose
whatsoever and Righthaven shall have no right or license to Exploit or participate in the receipt of
royalties from the Exploitation of the . . . Assigned Copyrights other than the right to proceeds in
association with a Recovery.”) (emphasis in original).
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Strategic Alliance Agreement (“SAA”) with LVR-J,47 only the “beneficial owner of an
exclusive right under copyright law is entitled, or has standing to sue.”48
D. Prenda Law, The Porn Trolling Firm
Prenda Law has also joined the ranks among the companies labeled as copyright
trolls by learning vicariously from the Righthaven business model before filing a
number of pornography-related infringement suits for clients such as AF Holdings,
LLC, and Ingenuity 13, LLC.49 On August 6, 2012, in AF Holdings LLC v. Does,50 the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted Prenda Law’s motion to
compel an Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) to comply with plaintiff’s subpoena
because it was not an “undue burden.”51 Consequently, the ISP was required to
disclose information regarding the identity of 1,058 individuals who allegedly
downloaded and distributed the plaintiffs’ obscure adult film entitled “Popular
Demand” through BitTorrent.52 As a result, Prenda Law’s business model was not
disrupted, and the firm continues to disperse extortionate settlement letters to
alleged infringers, many of whom settle out of fear of being associated with
pornography.53 The plaintiffs could not easily rid themselves of the suit, as the court

47 Id. (SAA governed future copyright assignments between Righthaven and LRV-J, detailed
the relationship between the parties, outlined the rights and responsibilities of each party, and it
limited and explained the intent behind the assignment executed in July 2010).
48 Id. at 972–74, 976 (noting that the SAA prevents Righthaven from obtaining any of the
exclusive rights necessary to maintain standing in a copyright infringement action because
Righthaven did not “obtain any rights other than the bare right to sue”).
49 Joe Patrice, Judge Threatens Alleged Copyright Troll With Jail Over Porn Complaints,
ABOVE THE LAW, (Feb. 12, 2013, 12:47 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/02/judge-threatens-allegedcopyright-troll-with-jail-over-porn-complaints/. Prenda Law is a successor to Steele Hansmeier that
files a “number of suits on behalf of clients such as AF Holdings, alleging copyright infringement”
against “John Does” to secure settlements because the average person accused of downloading porn
prefers to avoid public record. Id. AF Holdings is incorporated in the Caribbean, which makes its
corporate structure much more difficult to probe and does not take measures to ensure copyright
theft actually took place. Id.
50 AF Holdings LLC v. Does, 286 F.R.D. 39, 64 (D.D.C. 2012).
51 Id. at 50 (holding that the complaint sufficiently alleged prima facie allegations of copyright
infringement and since there are no named defendants, the plaintiff must obtain information
necessary to identify the alleged copyright infringers in order to proceed with the lawsuit); see also
FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(iv) (stating that “on timely motion, the issuing court must quash or
modify a subpoena that . . . subjects a person to undue burden”); In re AOL, LLC, 550 F. Supp. 2d
606, 612 (E.D. Va. 2008) (holding that “[w]hen a non-party claims that a subpoena is burdensome
and oppressive, the non-party must support its claim by showing how production would be
burdensome”).
52 AF Holdings, 286 F.R.D. at 54 (recognizing that BitTorrent is an online peer-to-peer filesharing protocol that allows users to download files through a “piecemeal system with multiple
pieces of data coming from peer members [] usually referred to as a ‘swarm’ . . . [and] any seed peer
that has downloaded a file prior to the time a subsequent peer downloads the same file is
automatically a source for the subsequent peer so long as that first seed peer is online at the time
the subsequent peer downloads a file”) (first alteration in original).
53 See Patrice, supra note 49.
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determined that personal jurisdiction and joinder were not appropriate issues at that
procedural juncture.54
Most notably, on March 26, 2013, in CP Productions v. Glover,55 the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted Prenda Law’s motion for
default judgment against a defendant,56 who failed to defend in the action despite
being served with a Summons.57 Accordingly, the court awarded Prenda Law’s client,
CP Productions, the maximum award for statutory damages amounting to $150,000
and attorneys’ fees due to the default judgment regarding the alleged willful
infringement of the rights holder’s copyright.58
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Origins of the Incentive: From Copy-“right” to Copy-“wrong”
The Internet has enabled non-rights holders to effortlessly disseminate
copyrighted materials to much larger audiences than the drafters of the Copyright
Act could have possibly foreseen. The widespread use of online file-sharing
technologies has exposed a deep chasm, which created a fundamental disconnect
between what copyright law prohibits and what is generally accepted on the

54 AF Holdings, 286 F.R.D. at 46, 50 (finding that evaluating the defendants’ jurisdictional
defenses at this procedural time is premature because it is purely speculative); see also Arista
Records LLC v. Does 1–19, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2011) (“not[ing] that [while] the remedy for
improper joinder is severance and not dismissal . . . the Court also finds that this inquiry is
premature without first knowing Defendants’ identities and the actual facts and circumstances
associated with Defendants’ conduct”); Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1–1,062, 770 F. Supp. 2d
332, 343 (D.D.C. 2011) (concluding that “at this nascent stage of the case, the plaintiffs have
sufficiently alleged that the infringing activity at issue in each of the cases may involve multiple
computers, based in various jurisdictions, which are using the BitTorrent protocol to make available
for sharing the same copyrighted content”).
55 Plaintiff’s Request to Enter Default at 1, CP Prods. Inc. v. Gerald L. Glover, III, No. 1:12-cv00808-JMS-DML (S.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2013) (CP filed two requests for the court to enter default
judgment.).
56 Order at 1, CP Prods. Inc. v. Gerald L. Glover, III, No. 1:12-cv-00808-JMS-DML (S.D. Ind.
Mar. 26, 2013) [hereinafter CP Order] (granting the default judgment by holding that “CP’s
allegations in the Amended Complaint—which the Court takes as true due to Mr. Glover’s default—
are sufficient to establish that CP is entitled to statutory damages for Mr. Glover’s willful
infringement of CP’s copyright, and for attorneys’ fees and costs under the Copyright Act”); see also
FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a) (stating that “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise,
the clerk must enter the party’s default”).
57 CP Order, supra note 56 (granting CP’s motion for Default Judgment after its Second
Request to Enter Default, reasoning that Mr. Glover did not respond to CP’s Motion for Default
Judgment and, therefore, takes CP’s allegations in the amended complaint as true).
58 Final Judgment at 1, CP Prods. Inc. v. Gerald L. Glover, III, No. 1:12-cv-00808-JMS-DML
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2013).
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Internet.59 In this strife to balance the author’s creativity and “the public’s access to
the products of their genius,” Congress has inadvertently carved out a lucrative
channel for imaginative copyright trolls to aggressively exploit.60 Moreover, the once
indiscernible targets for copyright trolls can now be unveiled by tracking Internet
Protocol addresses and log databases. These indiscernible targets materialize as
potential defendants through subpoenas during discovery.61
Recognizing this
obstruction to innovation, in June 2013, President Obama personally condemned
practices used by patent and copyright trolls of inundating the courts with
infringement claims, by stating that these companies “don’t actually produce
anything themselves,” and instead create a business model “to essentially leverage
and hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they can extort some money out of them.”62
Accordingly, this section will examine the progression of the copyright troll, judicial
opinions, and legal arguments derived from three unique businesses operating under
the guise of digital rights defenders in order to analyze the status of copyright trolls
under the applicable legal structure introduced above.
B. Copyright Troll Tactics: the Legal Ransom Letter and Unequal Bargaining Power
The archetypical copyright troll employs a distinct series of Machiavellian
stratagems, which lay the foundations for the copyright-lawsuit “factories” and
incentivize the mass-litigation business model.63 First, Righthaven propagated the

59 See Tehranian, supra note 9, at 543 (identifying a “balanced struggle between copyright
maximalists and skeptics” resulting in a “policy stalemate” that is profound yet unappreciated; thus,
creating the need for reform).
60 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (observing
that “the monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily
designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an
important public purpose may be achieved”).
61 See Tehranian, supra note 9, at 549 (reexamining the rationality of our intellectual property
structure because ISPs “made previously undetectable ‘sharing’ both visible and traceable,” which
expanded enforcement of copyright law).
62 See Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-Tech Patent
Issues (June 4, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-housetask-force-high-tech-patent-issues.
63 See Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground, LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 968, 971 (D. Nev.
2011). Righthaven alleged that after the Work in question was published on DU’s website, it
purchased the copyright to the article from the LVR-J owner, Stephens Media, and filed a copyright
infringement suit against the infringer. Id.; see also Righthaven LLC v. Realty One Grp., Inc., No.
2:10-cv-1036-LRH-PAL, 2010 WL 4115413, at *2 (D. Nev. Oct. 18, 2010). In that case the court
noted,

[A]fter [defendants] displayed the Work, plaintiff Righthaven obtained a transfer
of rights for the Work from the Review Journal. Righthaven then filed for and
received a copyright registration for the Work . . . . Righthaven [then] filed a
complaint against defendants alleging a single cause of action for copyright
infringement pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 501.
Id.
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most vital instrument in a troll’s arsenal, the extortionate settlement letter.64
Second, Righthaven’s unequal bargaining power was primarily embodied within the
threat of statutory damages, which were used to coerce everyday hyperlinkers into
quick settlements to avoid costly litigation.65 Despite Righthaven’s insolvency, two
pivotal cases66 represent more than simply the involuntary dissolution of a litigious
company. Rather, they stand for a lucrative opportunity to the observant copyright
troll.67
On October 18, 2010, in Righthaven LLC v. Realty One Group, Inc., the United
States District Court for the District of Nevada granted the defendant’s motion to
dismiss after holding that the form of hyperlinking Righthaven belligerently
prosecuted was ultimately lawful under the Fair Use doctrine.68 In that case, a
licensed realtor displayed an unauthorized hyperlink to a LVR-J publication on his
Internet blog, which provided home ownership information to the general public.69
Righthaven attempted to initiate its vicious cycle and sent the realtor the boilerplate
settlement letter.70 The realtor, however, substantially disrupted the traditional troll
cycle by declining the settlement and contesting the case at the pretrial level.71
Subsequently, Righthaven was forced to break the sue-to-settle strategy and argue
that when the realtor reproduced the first eight sentences of a thirty-sentence news
article accompanied by a hyperlink on his blog, this activity constituted willful

64 See Esguerra, supra note 34 (asserting that “Righthaven isn’t sending cease and desist
letters or DMCA takedown notices that would allow the targeted bloggers or website operators to
remove or amend only the news articles owned by Righthaven. Instead, Righthaven starts with a
full-fledged lawsuit in federal court with no warning”).
65 Id. (asserting further that “Righthaven is relying on the fact that [its] victims may face huge
legal bills through crippling statutory damages and the prospect of paying Righthaven’s legal fees if
they lose the case[, therefore,] many victims will [likely] settle with Righthaven for a few thousand
dollars regardless of their innocence”).
66 Realty One Group, 2010 WL 4115413, at *3; Righthaven LLC v. Mostofi, No. 2:10-CV-1066KJD-GWF, 2011 WL 2746315, at *3 (D. Nev. July 13, 2011).
67 See generally Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One’s Customers and the Dilemma of
Infringement-Based Business Models, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 725, 727–28 (2005). Professor
Hughes looks to the business of suing one’s own customers propagated by the recording industry,
which sought to “enforce copyright norms against individual consumers—the individual P2P users
offering and downloading music files.” Id. Initially, the recording industry began suing individual
P2P users as an ancillary revenue stream because their online activities “forced the recording
industry to reassess its strategy” regarding online infringers. Id.
68 Realty One Group, 2010 WL 4115413, at *3. The court discussed fair use:

[when] determining . . . fair use of the copyright, district courts consider several
factors including: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Id. at *2.
69 Id.
70 See id.
71 Id.
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copyright infringement subject to statutory damages.72 However, the court found
that the defendant’s online activity did not infringe upon Righthaven’s copyright as a
matter of law, which enabled the Fair Use doctrine to collapse one of the tenuous
pillars supporting Righthaven’s formulaic business model.73
Ultimately, on July 13, 2011, in Righthaven LLC v. Mostofi, the maimed troll
made a final attempt to remedy the critical issue of standing to sue in a transparent
effort to amend their complaint after it was found that Righthaven was not the
exclusive rights holder.74 In that case, a website owner was sued for copyright
infringement based off of a publication in which he allegedly changed the title of an
original work owned by the LVR-J entitled “Court Reprimands Lawyer Over
Misleading Ads,” to an alternate title: “Las Vegas Lawyer Reprimanded for False
Advertising.”75 Within the amendment, Righthaven “attempt[ed] to impermissibly
amend the facts to manufacture standing.”76 The court noted that “[it] may allow
parties to amend defective allegations of jurisdiction, [but] it may not allow the
parties to amend the facts themselves.”77 Accordingly, the court granted the website
owner’s motion to dismiss, which signified one of the final debilitating strikes against
the already injured troll.78
In sum, Righthaven’s systematic business operations were officially labeled
with an indelible mark by U.S. District Court Judge Hunt as “disingenuous, if not
outright deceitful . . . [making] multiple inaccurate and likely dishonest statements
to the court.”79 Further, Righthaven was also ordered to show cause why it should
72 Id. at *1–2 (observing that “although [defendant’s] blog gathers varied information and
provides it to the public free of charge, the purpose of providing that information is commercial in
nature. Therefore, the court finds that this factor weighs against the fair use of the copyrighted
information”).
73 Id. at *2 (finding that the defendant’s use of the copyrighted material is “likely to have little
to no effect on the market for the copyrighted news article” because he directed readers to the full
text of the Work, which supports a finding of fair use).
74 Righthaven LLC v. Mostofi, No. 2:10-CV-1066-KJD-GWF, 2011 WL 2746315, at *3 (D. Nev.
July 13, 2011).
“[Righthaven] argue[d] that the amendment it executed with Stephens
Media . . . fixes any possible errors in the original SAA that would prevent Plaintiff from having
standing in this matter.” Id.
75 Id. at *1.
76 Id. at *3. The court also held that “[w]hile these exclusive rights may be transferred and
owned separately, the assignment of a bare right to sue is ineffectual because it is not one of the
exclusive rights. . . . [T]ransfer solely of the right to sue does not confer standing on the assignee.”
Id. at *2.
77 Id. at *3. Also, the court provides an illustration of this point:

Id.

[a]s an example, a party who misstates his domicile may amend to correctly state
it. This is an amendment of the allegation. However, that party is not permitted
to subsequently move in order to change his domicile and amend accordingly.
This would be an amendment of the jurisdictional facts, which is not allowed.

78 Id. at *5. The court also held that viewed that in light of Righthaven’s SAA business model,
comprised of the assignment for the bare right to sue, the “Court shall not consider the amended
language of the SAA, but the actual assignment and language of the SAA as it existed at the time
the complaint was filed.” Id. at *3.
79 Order at 15, Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground, LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 968 (D.
Nev. 2011) (No. 116), available at https://www.eff.org/node/58496 (noting that “[m]aking this failure
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not be sanctioned for its flagrant misrepresentations to the court.80 Although the
courts left this particular troll dismembered, to a copyright troll, these cases
represent an opportunity to further develop this business model in order to
circumvent issues of standing and the Fair Use doctrine.81 Correspondingly, as the
divide between the Copyright Act and users’ online social norms expands, technology
presents the observant troll with the prospect of partnering with a new industry.82
C. Titanic in the Fog: From Carte Blanche Discovery to Dead but Still Standing
Regrettably, Righthaven’s failure bred a new wave of copyright brutes—the
pornography trolls—which have proven to be more patently nefarious than their
hyperlinking predecessors.83 Prenda Law, taking a page directly from their fallen
patriarch’s playbook, strategically evaded the Fair Use and standing pitfalls, at least
initially.84
Learning from Righthaven’s shortcomings, this Chicago-based anti-piracy firm is
operating on a much larger scale.85 Prenda Law’s predatory practice entails gaining
the identities of thousands of alleged pornography downloaders per subpoena to an
ISP, sending them settlement letters, and not making any effort to hide from public
scrutiny.86 On October 15, 2012, John Steele, a Prenda Law attorney, stated in an
interview to Forbes Magazine that he has filed over 350 of these suits, made “a few
million dollars” in settlements, and is currently suing approximately 20,000 John

more egregious, not only did Righthaven fail to identify Stephens Media as an interested party in
this suit, the Court believes that Righthaven failed to disclose Stephens Media” as an interested
party in any of its approximately 200 cases already filed).
80 Id.
81 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
82 See Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 579. Ginsburg further explains that:
[t]he more infringement becomes integrated into the innovator’s business plan,
however, the less likely the entrepreneur is . . . to persuade a court of the
neutrality of its venture. . . . [B]usinesses built from the start on inducing
infringement will be held liable; judges will frown on drawing one’s start-up
capital from other people’s copyrights.
Id.

83 Id. (noting that entrepreneurs may draw inferences from the Court’s precedent in order to
make copyright infringement into a “business asset”).
84 Ingenuity 13, LLC v. Doe, No. C 12-4450 MMC (MEJ), 2012 WL 4110991, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 18, 2012). The court granted Prenda Law’s motion for expedited discovery while withstanding
a motion to dismiss. Id. The court held that the plaintiff pled a prima facie case of copyright
infringement by establishing valid copyright ownership and copying of constituent elements of the
original copyrighted work. Id.
85 Kashmir Hill, How Porn Copyright Lawyer John Steele Has Made ‘A Few Million Dollars’
Pursuing (Sometimes Innocent) ‘Porn Pirates,’ FORBES (Oct. 15, 2012, 2:09 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/10/15/how-porn-copyright-lawyer-john-steele-justifieshis-pursuit-of-sometimes-innocent-porn-pirates/.
86 Id. (reporting that Prenda Law attorney, John Steele, “almost proudly” stated in an
interview with Forbes that he is “considered the original copyright troll”).
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Does.87 Additionally, highlighting Prenda Law’s amplified fear tactics, its settlement
letters contain claims that similar infringement suits have led to judgments
exceeding $200,000.88 Further, Prenda Law’s settlement letters claim that similar
cases “regularly involve over $100,000 in legal fees and costs.”89 Finally, in
addressing the alleged infringers, Prenda Law’s legal ransom letters stated, “your
name will be forever associated with the outcome of the matter, particularly if you
prevail . . . [and] [d]ue to the sensitive nature of this issue, and our desire to avoid
unnecessary embarrassment, we will be glad to provide more detailed information
about this case.”90 Employing the threat of being perpetually linked to a suit
involving pornography copyright infringement, accompanied by the claim that the
matter will be “followed closely in the national media,” Prenda Law’s success in
settling cases rapidly surpassed that of the newspaper trolls.91
However, several audacious John Does have read past Prenda Law’s extortion
rhetoric and chosen the road less traveled: confronting the troll. This atypical John
Doe behavior, coupled with the efforts of non-profits like the Electronic Frontier
Foundation,92 has received California’s attention and revealed this misuse of the civil
justice system93—specifically, Prenda Law’s ability to file muddy claims that still
lead to the discovery phase, which opens the floodgate for another fusillade of threat
letters.
In the realm of illegal downloading, the Fair Use doctrine provides no defense to
willful online infringement; thus, making it more difficult to combat this “legal
shakedown.”94 Fortunately, alleged infringers are fighting back because, in many
instances, the possibility exists that the Internet subscriber accused of the
infringement did not even download the lascivious film in question.95

87 Id. (comparing Prenda Law’s tactics “to the one employed by the recording industry years
ago to sue people who were amassing huge music libraries through peer-to-peer sharing rather than
buying CDs”).
88 Duffy Law Letter, supra note 3 (stating that and internet account holder rejected the offered
settlement, made the argument that someone else had downloaded the content, and at trial the jury
“disregarded” the defense and returned a verdict against the user for $222,000 in damages).
89 Id.
90 Id. (stating that friends, family members, and blog sites are not reliable sources of legal
advice and should not be consulted).
91 Id. (claiming the Prenda law firm is “famous” for pursuing pornography infringement cases).
92 About EFF, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/about (last visited Sept. 7, 2013)
(describing a non-profit comprised of lawyers, policy analysts, activists, and technologists that
defend users’ digital rights while educating the press and public).
93 See Order Vacating Prior Early Discover Orders and Order to Show Cause at 2–3, Ingenuity
13 v. John Doe, No. 2:12-cv-8333-ODW(JCx) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2012), available at
http://www.popehat.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/December20OSC.pdf (Judge Otis Wright
ordered Prenda to explain why discovery is warranted to reveal the identity of John Does and
quashed Prenda Law’s previously issued subpoenas.).
94 Id. at 2 (stressing that the Court has a “duty to protect the innocent citizens of this district
from this sort of legal shakedown, even though a copyright holder’s rights may be infringed by a few
deviants”).
95 Id. Judge Wright emphasized that Ingenuity 13:

Must demonstrate to the Court . . . how it would proceed to uncover the identity of
the actual infringer once it has obtained subscriber information—given that the
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The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California Judge Otis Wright
revealed the troll’s true colors by exposing key flaws in the Prenda Law “fishingexpedition discovery” model.96 In addressing the potential for discovery abuse during
another attempt by Prenda Law to uncover the identities of John Does through
expedited discovery requests, Judge Wright stated, “IP address alone may yield
subscriber information . . . [b]ut that will only lead to the person paying for the
Internet service and not necessarily the actual infringer, who may be a family
member, roommate, employee, customer, guest, or even a complete stranger.”97 In
vacating the prior early discovery orders to “minimize the harassment . . . of innocent
citizens,”98 Judge Wright subsequently ordered Prenda Law to explain how it can
“guarantee to the Court that any such subscriber information would not be used to
simply coerce a settlement from the subscriber (the easy route), as opposed to finding
out who the true infringer is (the hard route).”99
Furthermore, in response to the argument that users have the ability to access
the wireless Internet connections of others (whether they are password protected or
not), Prenda Law has made the creative argument that defendants were negligent in
not properly securing a router.100 However, according to established precedent,
theories of copyright liability do not include negligence—only direct, vicarious, and
contributory infringement.101 On January 29, 2013, in AF Holdings LLC v. Rogers,
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California explained that “it is no
more likely that the subscriber to an IP address carried out a particular computer
function . . . than to say an individual who pays the telephone bill made a specific
telephone call.”102 In that case, an alleged pornography downloader uncovered
actual infringer may be a person entirely unrelated to the subscriber—while also
considering how to minimize harassment and embarrassment of innocent citizens.
Id.

96 Id. (viewing with the “public interest in mind, the Court is reluctant to allow. . . discovery
when all a plaintiff has is an IP address—the burden is on the plaintiff to find other ways to more
precisely identify the accused infringer without causing collateral damage.”).
97 Id. (“Under Ninth Circuit precedent, a plaintiff should ordinarily be allowed discovery to
uncover their identities, but discovery may be denied if it is (1) clear that discovery would not
uncover the identities, or (2) that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.”).
98 Id. at 2–3.
99 Id. at 2 (shifting the burden on Prenda Law to find “other ways to more precisely identify the
accused infringer without causing collateral damage” given the subject matter of the legal
accusations and the economics of defending a pornography infringement lawsuit).
100 AF Holdings LLC v. Rogers, No. 12cv1519 BTM(BLM), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11929, at *8
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2013) (arguing “Defendant was negligent in either (1) failing to secure his
internet connection, thereby allowing someone to use his internet account to copy and share
Plaintiff’s Video over the BitTorrent protocol, or (2) permitting someone to use his internet
connection to infringe Plaintiff’s copyright.”).
101 Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. Tabora, No. 12 Civ. 2234 (LAK), 2012 WL 2711381, at *6–7
(S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2012) (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,
930–31 (2005)). “The Copyright Act creates a cause of action in favor of the owner of a copyright for
direct copyright infringement. Moreover, those who ‘infringe[] vicariously by profiting from direct
infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it’ are secondarily liable ‘on a theory
of contributory or vicarious liability.’” Id. at *2.
102 AF Holdings, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11929, at *4–5 (citing In re BitTorrent Adult Film
Copyright Infringement Cases, No. 11-3995(DRH)(GRB), 2012 WL 1570765, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. May 1,
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Prenda Law’s hidden but exceptionally vulnerable Achilles tendon. Consequently,
the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss due to the risk of “false
positives,” “an allegation that an IP address is registered to an individual is not
sufficient in and of itself to support a claim that the individual is guilty of
infringement.”103
As a result, Prenda Law is “dead but still standing” for a multitude of reasons,
primarily because they have been ordered to appear in court to explain their
activities while they attempt to dismiss any pending actions in order to avoid adverse
rulings.104 On April 2, 2013, Prenda Law attorneys committed corporate suicide by
exercising their Fifth Amendment privileges against forced testimony.105
In

2012) (emphasizing that courts seek to “distinguish between subscribers and infringers” because
61% of U.S. homes have access to wireless internet; thus, the IP address subscriber may often be
innocent of infringement associated with the IP address)).
103 Id. at *5–6 (courts limit discovery for Doe defendants in online infringement cases to ensure
that potentially innocent subscribers are not “needlessly humiliated and coerced into unfair
settlements.”); see also Disc. Video Ctr., Inc., v. Does 1–29, 285 F.R.D. 161, 166 (D. Mass. Aug. 10,
2012) (recognizing “the improper assertion . . . that subscribers are Defendants is significant in that
it might well cause innocent subscribers (understandably concerned about the prospect of the
threatened public identification as a copyright infringer of [adult films]) to accede to unreasonable
settlement demands”); Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1–176, 279 F.R.D. 239, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting
the “risk of false positives” gives rise to potential unjust settlements coerced from innocent
defendants who want to avoid having their names publicly associated with illegally downloading
pornography).
104 Ingenuity 13 LLC v. Doe, No. 2:12-cv-8333-ODW(JCx), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17693, at *14
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2013). The “Court perceives that Plaintiff may have defrauded the Court. At the
center of this issue is the identity of a person named Alan Cooper and the validity of the underlying
copyright assignments” because the Plaintiff filed a copyright assignment signed by Alan Cooper on
behalf of the Plaintiffs. Id. The court continues by saying:
If it is true that Alan Cooper’s identity was misappropriated and the underlying
copyright assignments were improperly executed using his identity, then Plaintiff
faces a few problems. First, with an invalid assignment, Plaintiff has no standing
in these cases. Second, by bringing these cases, Plaintiff’s conduct can be
considered vexatious, as these cases were filed for a facially improper purpose.
And third, the Court will not idle while Plaintiff defrauds this institution.
Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS [plaintiff] TO SHOW CAUSE why he
should not be sanctioned . . . for violating the Court’s [] Order instructing AF
Holdings
to
cease
its
discovery
efforts[,] . . . alleging
copyright
infringement . . . without conducting a reasonable inquiry . . . [and] perpetrating
fraud on the Court by misappropriating the identity of Alan Cooper and filing
lawsuits based on an invalid copyright assignment.
Id. at *14–16.
105 See, e.g., Transcript of Record, Ingenuity 13 LLC, v. John Doe, et al., No. CV 12-8333 ODW
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2013), available at http://fightcopyrighttrolls.com/2013/04/02/most-of-prendaappears-in-judge-wrights-courtroom-only-to-plead-the-fifth-furious-judge-ends-hearing-after-12minutes/ (The court raised allegations of fraud, attorney misconduct, and the firm having a financial
interest in the outcome of the litigation, and in response the attorneys comprising Prenda Law pled
the Fifth.).
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response, Judge Wright stated “this court’s focus has now shifted dramatically from
the area of protecting intellectual property rights to attorney misconduct.”106
Moreover, on May 6, 2013, in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California, Judge Wright issued sanctions against Prenda Law attorneys
stating, “Plaintiffs have outmaneuvered the legal system. They’ve discovered the
nexus of antiquated copyright laws, paralyzing social stigma, and unaffordable
defense costs. And they exploit this anomaly by accusing individuals of illegally
downloading a single pornographic video.”107 Judge Wright further recognized that
“for these individuals, resistance is futile; most reluctantly pay rather than have
their names associated with illegally downloading porn. So now, copyright laws
originally designed to compensate starving artists allow, [sic] starving attorneys in
this electronic-media era to plunder the citizenry.”108 The court noted that once it
realized Plaintiffs engaged in a “cloak of shell companies and fraud” that the court
went to its “battlestations” by referring the matter and attorneys to their respective
state and federal bars, the United States Attorney for the Central District of
California, the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue Service, and
the judges before whom these attorneys have cases pending.109 As a result of the
effects of Judge Wright’s sanctions-order benchslap, a subpoena issued to Comcast
106 Id. at 6 (stressing that this form of attorney misconduct “is much more of a concern now to
this court than what this litigation initially was about”); see also Order Issuing Sanctions at 5,
Ingenuity 13, LLC, v. John Doe, No. 2:12-cv-8333-ODW(JCx) (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2013) [hereinafter
Ingenuity Sanctions Order]. The “[p]laintiffs’ filing of cases using the same boilerplate complaint
against dozens of defendants raised the Court’s alert. It was when the Court realized Plaintiffs
engaged their cloak of shell companies and fraud that the Court went to battlestations.” Id. at 2.
There are no official owners or officers for these two offshore entities at issue; conversely, the
“[p]rincipals are the de facto owners and officers.” Id. at 4. The court continues:

This nationwide strategy was highly successful because of statutory-copyright
damages, the pornographic subject matter, and the high cost of litigation. Most
defendants settled with the Principals, resulting in proceeds of millions of dollars
due to the numerosity of defendants. These settlement funds resided in the
Principals’ accounts . . . . No taxes have been paid on this income. . . . The
Principals have shown little desire to proceed in these lawsuits when faced with a
determined defendant. Instead of litigating, they dismiss the case. When pressed
for discovery, the Principals offer only disinformation—even to the Court.
Id.

107 Id. at 1. The court found that the Principals’ “enterprise relies on deception.” Id. at 8. The
evidence shows that the Principals ignored a Court Order vacating discovery in hopes that “the ISPs
were unaware of the vacatur and would turn over the requested subscriber information.” Id.
Additionally, there is the issue of the “Alan Cooper forgery,” where the Principals “stole the identity
Alan Cooper” and fraudulently signed copyright assignments using his signature while “holding him
out to be an officer of AF Holdings.” Id. at 5, 8. Furthermore, the Principals “anticipated that the
Court would blindly approve their early-discovery requests, thereby opening the door to more
settlement proceeds.” Id. at 8. Finally, the court emphasized that “though Plaintiffs boldly probe
the outskirts of the law, the only enterprise they resemble is RICO.” Id. at 10.
108 Id. at 2.
109 Id. at 2. The Principals took substantial measures to “obfuscate other facts, especially those
concerning their operations, relationships, and financial interests.” Id. at 8. Furthermore, the
“Principals’ web of disinformation is so vast that the Principals cannot keep track” because their
explanations of their financial interests and operations “constantly vary.” Id.
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during the investigation of this “anti-piracy” law firm has potentially unearthed one
of Prenda Law’s most egregious ploys.110 Specifically, an alarmingly large number of
the torrents detailed in Prenda Law’s infringement suits originated from a Pirate
Bay user operating under the pseudonym “Sharkmp4.”111
Furthermore, the
subpoenas encompassing the Comcast IP address 75.72.88.156 employed by
“Sharkmp4” revealed that the account holder to this IP address belonged to Steele
Hansmeier PLLC, which is the firm currently known as Prenda Law.112 These
unearthed facts fortifies the allegation that Prenda Law is seeding the very content
they hyper-aggressively protected and, like a “honeypot,” luring pornography pirates
into their vicious cycle.113 However, it is essential to note that just because the courts
have stopped this particular troll, the Copyright Act still affords the generous
opportunity for a new subset of troll to learn from this fallen fiend.114
D. Malibu Media, The Discovery Controversy Continues: Challenging A “Porn
Purveyor’s” Evidence of Smut-Sharing at Bellwether Trial
Malibu Media, LLC, mirroring Prenda Law, has employed an almost duplicative
predatory practice with a few distinct alterations.115 Malibu Media actually produces
adult erotica and has further refined and maximized the guilty-until-proven innocent
paradigm to its fullest potential.116 In 2012, Malibu Media filed over 360 copyright
infringement lawsuits against approximately 6,000 individuals in order to extract

110 Copyright Troll Ran Pirate Bay Honeypot, Comcast Confirms, TORRENTFREAK (Aug. 15,
2013),
http://torrentfreak.com/copyright-troll-ran-pirate-bay-honeypot-comcast-confirms-130815/
(noting that Comcast confirmed through a subpoena that this famous anti-piracy law firm has been
directly linked to a Pirate Bay user that hosted adult content).
111 Id.
112 Id. (stating “Comcast returned the subscriber details that matched the IP-address at the
time the files were uploaded” and the IP address in question was identified as the Comcast account
owned by Steele Hansmeier PLLC, which is directly linked to Prenda Law).
113 Id. Defendant’s counsel employed Delvan Neville, the owner of Amaragh Associates. Id.
Amaragh Associates utilizes a BitTorrent monitoring suite called EUPSC2k, which uses a “variety
of software components conceptualized, developed, and maintained in order to collect data about
both unauthorized and authorized distributions of any kind of file that could be shared via the
BitTorrent protocol.” Declaration of Delvan Neville at 1, First Time Videos, LLC v. Oppold, 6:12CV-01493-CEH-KRS (M.D. Fla. June 3, 2013) [hereinafter Neville Declaration]. Within Neville’s
expert affidavit, he concluded that “the purpose of sharing the file by sharkmp4 appears to have
been in an effort to induce infringement for the purposes of monetization of copyrights of
commercially low value.” Id. at 30.
114 Neville Declaration, supra note 113, at 30.
115 See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. Does, No. 12-2078, 2013 WL 30648, at *16–17 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
3, 2013) (In this case, Malibu Media is the transferee of the exclusive rights to various copyrighted
pornographic films created by the company X-Art and prosecutes alleged BitTorrent downloaders of
said adult films.).
116 Id. at 2–5 (Malibu Media filed copyright infringement complaints against large groups of
John Does participating in “swarms” of computer-users who downloaded and shared pieces of motion
pictures with each other, sent subpoenas to ISPs that had assigned the IP addresses that were
associated with the alleged illegal downloads of their copyrighted works, and sought settlements
from the alleged infringers.).
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quick settlements.117 Specifically, Malibu Media’s copyright troll solution engenders
a few new colligative properties: the “six strikes” Copyright Alert System (“CAS”)
and enhanced infringer surveillance software acting as the solutes, which are
dissolved into the solvent—the “serial copyright infringers.”118 This concentrated
copyright enforcement solution yields this new troll on the block with larger
settlements while enabling them to strategically trickle through the discovery phase
with their newfound viscosity.119
First, in February 2013, the “six strikes” CAS was implemented by a number of
major ISPs in an effort to deter online piracy and notify content owners.120 This
graduated alert system operated by the nonprofit Center for Copyright Information
(“CCI”) enables rights holders to monitor peer-to-peer (“P2P”) file-sharing networks,
detect when a user is infringing upon a protected work, and send the ISP a
notification of the violation.121 Subsequently, the ISP relays this information to the
alleged infringer’s ISP address in the form of a notification, which administers one of
the “six strikes.”122 Furthermore, Malibu Media is attempting to test this new anti117 See, e.g., Malibu Media’s Massive Fraud, FIGHT COPYRIGHT TROLLS (Nov. 10, 2012),
http://fightcopyrighttrolls.com/2012/11/10/malibu-medias-massive-fraud/.
The Pietz Law Firm
tracks Malibu Media’s lawsuits and represents the interests of John Does who have been sued by
the company. Id.
118 See, e.g., Malibu Media, 2013 WL 30648, at *3–5. Malibu Media filed complaints against
three groups of fourteen to twenty-two John Doe defendants who have downloaded and shared
copyrighted adult films owned by the plaintiff. Id. at *2. Defendants participated in “BitTorrent
Swarms,” which are initiated when a computer-user called an “initial seeder” obtains a target
computer file, divides it into segments, assigns a unique identifier called a “hash” to each segment,
and uploads the segmented file onto a BitTorrent website. Id. at *4–5. Other users then access the
website, upload the segments of the file on their personal computers, and distribute these segments
with each other. Id. Thus, all of the seeders and peers are collaborating in what is identified as a
“swarm.” Id. When a peer has downloaded every segment of the original file, software on the user’s
computer will reassemble them into a viewable video. Id. at *4.
119 Id. at *37–38 (denying defendants’ Motions to Dismiss because Malibu has provided
material in order to show a “pattern or practice” of online copyright infringement by “making an
allegation which may become evidence to support its claim to relief”).
120 UA Law Professor Explains New ‘6-Strikes’ Copyright Alert System, UNIV. ARIZ. NEWS,
http://uanews.org/blog/ua-law-professor-explains-new-6strikes-copyright-alert-system (last visited
Oct. 5, 2013) (explaining that the Six Strikes system was launched in an “effort to crack down on
online piracy” by targeting activity like illegal sharing and downloading of music and films, which
has come “under fire” by many copyright experts due to its “format and for the way it was developed
and implemented”).
121 Id. (The system is operated by the “nonprofit Center for Copyright Information (CCI), which
was essentially set up as the result of a grand bargain between most major Internet service
providers and a set of content owner companies, such as movie studios and record labels” in an effort
to deter online copyright infringement.).
122 Id. The CCI claims this is an education system, whereby the education gets more strident
as a result of an IP address being associated with reoccurring infringements. Id. Initially, a pop-up
alert appears on the downloader’s computer stating that someone on the computer has been
unlawfully sharing files and to stop. Id. The downloader receives two alerts that are intended as
“initial education,” subsequently, it escalates to the level where the user must sign in to remove the
pop-up, and in some instances the user has to watch an educational video about copyrights. Id. The
final two strikes are entitled to “mitigation.” Id. CCI claims that mitigation is “intended to really
get your attention by doing things like slowing down your bandwidth, or the amount of speed you
have connecting to the Internet. After the sixth strike, nobody really knows what happens.” Id.
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piracy enforcement instrument among many others by seeking to gain information
relating to the strikes through a subpoena to ISPs, such as Verizon Online, LLC.123
Moreover, the CAS agreement engenders no provision that prohibits rights holders
from using the information collected during the six strikes process in copyright
infringement suits.124
Addressing the second solute, Malibu Media is bolstering its tactics by enhanced
software surveillance of these alleged infringers in order to primarily target
persistent infringers that perform website-rips, which are large multi-gigabyte
downloads containing a number of copyrighted videos.125 Thus, when examining the
solvent’s reaction, Malibu Media gains unparalleled bargaining power and can
extract larger settlements from alleged infringers, reportedly between $7,500–13,500,
due to the potential for multiple infringement claims.126
On June 10, 2013, in Malibu Media, LLC, v. John Does 1, 6, 13, 14 and Bryan
White, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held
what was to be a Bellwether bench trial to examine the sufficiency of the evidence
gathered by this particular troll regarding the BitTorrent downloads of the plaintiff’s

123 See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Subpoena at 6–7, Malibu Media, LLC, v. Verizon
Online, LLC, No. 2–12-cv-02078-MMB (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Malibu Motion to
Enforce] (Plaintiff seeks “six strike notices sent to the applicable subscribers” because they are
relevant to “prove a pattern of infringement and/or notice that infringement is occurring.”).
124 Michael Masnick, Copyright Troll Malibu Media Seeking ‘Six Strikes’ Info From Verizon in
Lawsuit, TECHDIRT (Apr. 3, 2013, 5:52AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130402/
18393522554/copyright-troll-malibu-media-seeking-six-strikes-info-verizon-lawsuit.shtml. The CAS
agreement lacks a provision that prohibits rights holders from filing a subpoena seeking disclosure
of information gathered during Six Strikes process. Id. Malibu Media is the first company publicly
labeled as a copyright troll to attempt to gather CAS information to identify alleged infringers. See
also Malibu Motion to Enforce, supra note 123, at 6–7 (seeking DMCA notices and six strike notices
sent to respective subscribers, Defendants’ bandwidth usage, information about the correlation of
the IP address to the subscriber, the reliability of the ISPs’ correlating technique, and the content
viewed by the Defendants that they also used P2P file-sharing websites to download).
125 Malibu
Media, LLC—Friend or Foe?, Foe, TORRENTLAWYER (Mar. 23, 2012),
http://torrentlawyer.wordpress.com/2012/03/23/malibu-media-copyright-troll-kotzker-lawsuit/
[hereinafter Malibu Media article] (emphasizing that Malibu Media is charging per video that has
been allegedly downloaded instead of charging a fixed settlement amount per case, which many
copyright trolls have done in the past); see also Malibu Media, LLC v. Does, No. 12-2078, 2013 WL
3038025, at *8 (E.D. Pa. June 18, 2013) (noting that Malibu Media had “expended considerable
effort and expense to determine the IP addresses” of the allegedly infringing parties through the
technology utilized by its consultants); Plaintiff’s Written Response to the Court’s
Memorandum/Order at 18, Malibu Media, LLC, v. John Doe Subscriber Assigned IP address
68.50.250.243, No. 8:13-cv-00360-RWT (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Malibu Written
Response]. Malibu Media employs an IPP forensic company that harvests IP addresses from
BitTorrent trackers using software to monitor John Does that download large numbers of
pornographic films. Id. Malibu Media claims that “the detection technology employed by IPP, Ltd.
is simply not a major concern of Plaintiff’s. It is infallible and the process is not impeachable. If
challenged, Plaintiff will prove these points.” Id.
126 See Malibu Media article, supra note 125 (Malibu Media has developed a new “method” of
determining how to calculate settlement amounts giving them a means to justify large settlements
because in lieu of charging fixed settlement amounts per case, Malibu Media is charging per video
allegedly downloaded).
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adult films.127 Judge Michael Baylson explained that the justification for a
Bellwether trial is to act as an indicator of future court trends regarding online
infringement claims brought against large groups of anonymous defendants.128
Initially, the trial was comprised of three consolidated cases, originally totaling fiftytwo defendants, but that number was drastically reduced to just three John Does
because Malibu Media settled and voluntarily dismissed the remainder of the
Does.129 In that case, Does 1 and 13 admitted to liability and engaged in confidential
settlement agreements prior to the trial.130 Judge Baylson subsequently bifurcated
the issue of damages with respect to Does 1 and 13, which enabled the court to enter
a judgment of liability encompassing the three defendants while entering a judgment
of damages only as to John Doe 16.131
In addressing the issue of willful copyright infringement, Judge Baylson found
that remaining John Doe 16 had attempted to destroy electronic evidence of the
online infringement and committed perjury when later admitting to pirating five
downloaded works belonging to Malibu Media.132 The court held that, in this case,
Malibu Media was the bona fide owner and producer of the copyrighted material and
found the defendant liable for $112,500 in statutory damages.133 Consequently, this
bench trial will not act as an accurate barometer of future court trends regarding
large copyright troll cases because: 1) it was reduced to three viable defendants; 2)
Malibu Media actually owned the specific copyrights; and 3) the risk of false positives
was eliminated due to the defendants’ admission to piracy.134 Ultimately, the

127 Malibu Media, 2013 WL 3038025, at *1; see also Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, 902 F. Supp. 2d
690, 702 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (“Bellwether trials have long been recognized as an effective means of
enhancing prospects of settlement or for resolving common issues or claims in complex litigations.”);
In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1020 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he results of such trials can be
beneficial for litigants who desire to settle such claims by providing information on the value of the
cases as reflected by jury verdicts. Common issues or even general liability may also be resolved in
a bellwether context in appropriate cases.”). See generally Eldon E. Fallon, et al., Bellwether Trials
in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2323 (2008) (providing extended explanations of
the advantages and potential uses of Bellwether Trials).
128 Malibu Media, 2013 WL 3038025, at *1 (explaining that a “Bellwether” Trial “would be the
best way to achieve a resolution of numerous copyright infringement complaints filed in this district
by Plaintiff Malibu Media, LLC,” which alleged that defendants downloaded its adult films without
paying a licensing fee and were therefore liable for damages).
129 Id. at *4–7, 11 (consolidating cases that allege Copyright Act violations by Defendants for
downloading pornographic movies produced by Plaintiff for Bellwether trial, which included Does 6
and 14).
130 Id. at *11.
131 Id. at *21–22.
132 Id. at *18, 25–26 (stating that in view of John Doe 16’s perjury and spoliation charges, there
was no longer any justification for him to proceed anonymously and he identified himself as Bryan
White).
133 Id. at *26.
In response to Bryan White’s perjury and the deletion of evidence, Judge
Baylson awarded a “heavy dose of damages” to also act “as a deterrent to others.” Id. Regarding
attorneys’ fees and costs, Malibu Media was awarded the stipulated amount of $128,350 against
Bryan White. Id.
134 Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 577–78 (2008).
Professor Lahav states:
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Bellwether trial did not challenge the pornography purveyor’s evidence of file-sharing
through advanced surveillance. Nothing material was determined in regards to troll
practices and future court trends, and the defendants were equally culpable for this
failure.135
Conversely, simply because Malibu Media was able to successfully eliminate the
risk of false positives because of defendants’ admissions at the Bellwether trial does
not mean that the results should be interpreted so as to publicly remove the insignia
of the troll and rename them as zealous defenders of digital rights.136 In that specific
context, although Judge Baylson emphasized that Malibu Media did not fit the
traditional definition of a copyright troll because it is the actual producer of the adult
films, the credibility of its advanced surveillance software has yet to be truly
challenged.137 Thus, the aggressive tactics of this sophisticated rights holder remain
intact, and allow it to continue to extract innumerable settlements from John Does
while ensnaring the innocent into costly litigation.138 Displaying a more refined
manner of threating statutory damages accompanied by fear of being associated with
obscene material, Malibu Media has fine-tuned the sue-to-settle business model.139
In a bellwether trial procedure, a random sample of cases large enough to yield
reliable results is tried to a jury. A judge, jury, or participating lawyers use the
resulting verdicts as a basis for resolving the remaining cases. Judges currently
use bellwether trials informally in mass tort litigation to assist in valuing cases
and to encourage settlement. Instituted as a formal procedure, bellwether trials
offer an innovative way to achieve collective justice . . . because they realize the
democratic policies animating the jury right and the aims of the substantive law.
These trials promote a type of “group typical” justice that is at once participatory
and collective.
Id.

135 See, e.g., John Whitaker, Bellwether Trial: Why it was a Bust, COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
ADVISOR (June 13, 2013), http://copyright.infringementadvisor.com/2013/06/bellwether-trial-why-itwas-bust.html (explaining that the case was not a bellwether trial because there was nothing at
issue, it was a bench trial where the involved parties admitted to liability, agreed on damages prior,
and none of the relevant facts were contested).
136 Id. See Malibu Media, LLC, v. Assigned Ip Address 24.183.51.58, No. 13-cv-205-wmc, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128615, at *11–12 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 10, 2013) (imposing sanctions against Malibu
Media for its traditional practice of attaching an unrelated exhibit to their claims against John
Does, which contained graphic pornography titles allegedly downloaded, and for which Malibu
Media did not own the copyrights).
137 Malibu Media, LLC v. Does, No. 12-2078, 2013 WL 3038025, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 18, 2013)
(noting that a “copyright troll” has traditionally been defined in the media and legal publications as
“a non-producer who merely has acquired the right to bring lawsuits against alleged infringers.”).
138 Id. at 26. Judge Baylson stated:

[T]he infringement cases brought by Malibu and other similarly situated
companies have attracted a great deal of attention, not only of federal district
judges but also of bloggers who assert that “copyright trolls” are using
unscrupulous tactics and false accusations to collect millions of dollars from
innocent and injured computer users. I do not have any opinion as to the truth of
the situation as regards to other plaintiffs in other courts.
Id.
139

Id. at 2.
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Further, as evinced by their litigious nature, the objectives of companies like Malibu
Media are not to go through discovery and the entire litigation process, despite their
success in challenging the culpable John Does.140 Instead, Malibu pursues an
ancillary rapid-settlement business model by filing against an insurmountable
number of John Does, inundating the courts and depriving them of the necessary
revenues to operate.141
In sum, Malibu Media’s reputation for vehemently defending its erotic content is
not without a blemish.142 On September 10, 2013, the United States District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin imposed sanctions against Malibu Media for its
regular practice of attaching an unrelated and mortifying “Exhibit C” to the 11
complaints listed in Malibu Media, LLC, v. Assigned IP Address 24.138.51.58.143
Specifically, each of these respective exhibits “purports to include titles of other
movies not subject to plaintiff’s copyright, but downloaded by the as yet anonymous
defendant and chosen by plaintiff to embarrass and harass [in order] to leverage
settlement.”144
The court concluded that Malibu Media’s “intent was to harass and intimidate
defendants into early settlements by use of the salacious nature of others’ materials,
rather than the merit of its own copyright claims.”145 The court further noted that
“[t]hese [I]nternet copyright infringement cases already give off an air of extortion,
albeit legitimate since (at least as alleged) each ‘John Doe’ defendant did violate
plaintiff’s copyrights.”146 The court scrutinized counsels’ copyright enforcement
tactics for “purveyors of pornographic films (even ‘classy’ ones) by suing initially
140 See, e.g., Whitaker, supra note 135, (stating that he hopes “a defendant who gets one of
these letters will have the fortitude to stand up for what is right and push the issue all the way to a
real trial in front of a real jury. Only then will we know how strong the plaintiff’s case really is.”).
141 Compare Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 8:12-cv-1667-T-27MAP, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
183969, at *1, 21 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2012) (severing defendants and dismissing claims against Does 1
and 4–28 reasoning that “by filing multi-defendant complaints, Malibu’s lawsuits have deprived the
court of hundreds of thousands of dollars in much needed revenue while burdening the docket with
cases that are difficult to manage.”), with Media v. Doe, No. 2:12-cv-267-UA-SPC, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 182212, at *1–2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2012) (severing and dismissing all claims against Does 267 without prejudice leaving John Doe 1 remaining in the action), and Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe,
285 F.R.D. 273, 277–79 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (denying motion to sever five John Does finding the
defendants related because the pieces of film allegedly shared are traceable back to the same
original file and the concept of joinder “must be able to adapt to the technologies of our time.”).
142 See e.g., Malibu Media, LLC, v. Assigned Ip Address 24.183.51.58, No. 13-cv-205-wmc, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128615, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 10, 2013) (identifying that Malibu Media, “a
purveyor of so-called adult films, has joined many others in bringing lawsuits in federal courts
against anonymous defendants” that allegedly downloaded adult films and the “graphic titles and
content are enough to persuade many initially anonymous defendants to reach early settlements out
of fear of being ‘outed’ should the lawsuit proceed.”).
143 Id. at *14–15.
144 Id. at *3, 5–6 (recognizing that the attached “Exhibit C” “serves no pleading purpose and
appears calculated principally to harass defendants in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)”) (emphasis
in original).
145 Id. at *4 (citing Malibu Media, LLC v. Reynolds, No. C 6672, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31228,
at *18–23 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2013) (highlighting cases that have recognized the pressure of suits
alleging copyright infringement of pornographic films "to shame defendants into settlement
agreements where they may otherwise have a meritorious defense.")).
146 Id. at *13–14.
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anonymous defendants.”147 In this case, Judge William Conley was aware that these
claims are “fraught with circumstances that could embarrass the putative defendant
should they become public and strongly influence his or her decision to settle even a
meritless suit just to make the case go away before being publically associated with
their client’s film.”148 The court recognized that “subpoena power may not be
leveraged further by counsel to force earlier, larger settlements through explicit
references to the alleged misuse of even more outrageous or potentially embarrassing
materials copyrighted by a non-client.”149
One may argue that Malibu Media should not be labeled with the pejorative
copyright troll title because it is the actual producer of the copyrighted works.
Malibu, however, evinces textbook troll tactics. It has even conceded in a response “it
is possible that someone other than the subscriber is the infringer,” despite its
previous assertion that “the detection technology employed by IPP, Ltd . . . is
infallible and the process is not impeachable.”150
III. PROPOSAL
With these issues in mind, academics, judges, and industry stakeholders have
proposed several approaches to compromise the disingenuous efforts of various trolls
by promoting accountability in copyright enforcement while restoring the framers’
original intent to the Copyright Act.151 This section will survey such proposals and
argue for a resolution that will prevent author and non-author rights holders’ misuse
of the judicial process at the discovery stage.

Id. at *14.
Id. at *14.
149 Id. (imposing a sanction against Malibu Media’s named “counsel and law firm, jointly, for
each time Exhibit C was attached to a complaint and publicly filed in this court.”).
150 Malibu Written Response, supra note 125, at 7, 18 (recognizing that information gathered
through its advanced surveillance engenders the possibility of being incorrect because “the
subscriber could be renting his or her house to a person using the subscribers [sic] internet to
commit an infringement . . . [or] may have relatives or friends living with him or her who use the
subscriber’s internet and are the infringers”).
151 Maria Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315, 326 (2013). As
the Register of Copyrights of the United States and Director of the U.S. Copyright Office, Ms.
Pallante says that:
147
148

A twenty-first century copyright act requires twenty-first century enforcement
strategies. These must respect the technical integrity and expressive capabilities
of the Internet as well as the rule of law. It is possible and necessary to combine
safeguards for free expression, guarantees of due process, and respect for
intellectual property in the copyright law. As the Supreme Court recognized, “the
Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.”
Id.
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A. The “Eliminate Statutory Damages” Approach
Several commentators have ardently suggested that the appropriate remedy to
resolve the increasingly prevalent copyright troll issue is to simply eliminate the
threat of statutory damages.152 This straightforward solution of removing the
inducement to utilize a sue-to-settle business model appears, on its face, to be a
strong deterrent to this type of litigation that seeks to extract money from copyright
infringement.153 However, this proposal raises more complex issues than it resolves.
It is neither narrowly tailored nor the least restrictive means of achieving the desired
result of remedying a recurring discovery abuse in a specific subset of copyright
infringement cases.154
The principal purpose of statutory damages within U.S. Copyright Law is to
afford rights holders adequate compensation when actual damages suffered is
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to prove.155 Although removing statutory
damages from the Copyright Act may arguably be an effective deterrent against
trolls, high damages is only one of the threats employed, particularly in cases of
pornography infringements.156 As a result, companies such as Prenda Law and
Malibu Media would still have substantial bargaining power. They would still be
able to induce small settlements on a large scale regardless of user culpability.157
152 Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in
Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 510 (2009). The authors state that:

As part of a more general revision of copyright law, Congress might even
reconsider whether statutory damages serve a desirable purpose in copyright
law . . . . The compensatory purpose of statutory damages continues to be
important, but, owing to the 1976 Act’s creation of an enhanced level of authorized
statutory damages for willful infringements, and the lack of principles to guide
jury or judicial deliberations on statutory damages, awards have too often been
arbitrary and inconsistent, and sometimes grossly excessive.
Id.

153 Nate Anderson, US Anti-P2P Law Firms Sue More in 2010 Than RIAA Ever Did, ARS
TECHNICA (Oct. 9, 2010, 1:57 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/10/us-anti-p2p-lawfirms-sue-more-in-2010-than-riaa-ever-did.ars (noting that ISPs are challenging the “legitimacy of
the entire detection process in court” because more than 24,000 John Doe Lawsuits were filed in
2010 alone).
154 See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 152, at 499 (stating that statutory damages
“clearly have a significant compensatory purpose” and Congress intended them to have a legitimate
goal of deterrence).
155 Id. at 446 n.22 (citing Stenographic Report of the Proceedings at the Third Session of the
Conference on Copyright (Mar. 13–16, 1906), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909
COPYRIGHT ACT PT. E, at 227–35 (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976)) (“The legislative
history of the 1909 Act contains numerous expressions of concern about the difficulties of proving
actual damages or defendant’s profits as a rationale for the adoption of a statutory damage
provision.”).
156 Duffy Law Letter, supra note 3 (noting that the settlement letter employs threats stating
similar cases involve over $100,000 in legal fees, defendants may be subject to a multi-year lawsuit,
and his or her name will be “forever associated” with the lawsuit regardless of the outcome).
157 Id. (using rhetoric to induce settlement within the demand letter claiming “this matter will
be followed closely in the national media . . . [and] several websites publish every pleading filed in
every one of our clients’ actions”).
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Further, removing statutory damages would result in significant disruptions to other
areas of copyright law.158 On one end of the copyright remedies continuum, removing
statutory damages will adversely affect
situations in which it [is] difficult for a copyright owner to prove what
actual damages [were] sustained and what profits the defendant made or
when it would be too expensive, for example, because of a possible need to
hire an expert witness, to prove damages or profits in comparison with the
amount that could be recovered.159
Further, on the opposite end of the spectrum, eliminating statutory damages will
drastically affect cases where egregious and massive copyright infringement
operations exist.160
A more operative means to a legitimate end would require courts to cabin
excessive statutory awards in online cases by strictly scrutinizing willful
infringement through a more rigid and less discretionary lens.161 This would still
preserve the “dual purposes of compensation and deterrence” without drastically
eliminating statutory damages from copyright law entirely and prevent “arbitrary,
inconsistent, unprincipled, and grossly excessive awards.”162 For instance, when
considering the appropriate amount of statutory damages, courts should adhere to
principles derived from case law and consider: “(1) expenses saved and profits reaped
by the infringer; (2) revenues lost by the plaintiff; (3) the strong public interest in
158 See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 152, at 497–99 (suggesting that copyright reform
is necessary because the complete removal of statutory damages is not warranted to fix a “damages
regime” that has been inconsistently applied and often results in arbitrary awards when it also
serves the benefits of compensation and deterrence).
159 Id. at 499 (explaining that statutory damages serves the essential purpose of compensating
rights holders that have an infringed copyright where the monetary burdens would exceed the
benefits of calculating actual damages).
160 Id. at 498 (The maximum statutory damages award of $150,000 “may, in fact, be a paltry
sum if there are millions in profits that could potentially be disgorged for infringement of a single
work,” for instance, counterfeited software.).
161 See Pallante, supra note 151, at 15. Pallante advised that

Statutory damages should remain squarely in the next great copyright act
irrespective of section 412. However, there may be plenty to do on the edges,
including providing guidance to the courts (e.g., in considering whether
exponential awards against individuals for the infringement of large numbers of
works should bear a relationship to the actual harm or profit involved).
Id.; see also Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. J.F. Reichert, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 458, 465 (E.D.
Pa. 1987) (The court looked to fellow courts in similar cases to determine factors to be examined
when computing “just” statutory damages awards.).
162 See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 152, at 509 (stating that legislative reform is
needed because courts ineffectively balance, without established guidelines, the “perceived need for
some compensation when damages and profits are difficult to prove . . . and the need for a higher
level of possible awards to be imposed on egregious infringers”); see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Spring
Mt. Area Bavarian Resort, LTD, 555 F. Supp. 2d 537, 544 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (discussing the twofold
purpose of statutory damages are to “compensate the plaintiff for the infringement of its copyrights;
and they deter future infringements by punishing the defendant for its actions.”).

[13:170 2013]
Copyright Trolls, Defining the Line Between
197
Legal Ransom Letter and Defending Digital Rights: Turning Piracy into a
Business Model and Protecting Creative from Internet Lawlessness?

insuring the integrity of the copyright laws; and (4) whether the infringement was
willful and knowing or innocent and accidental.”163
However, precisely defining the scope in which courts must assess statutory
damages awards in copyright cases—although representing a pivotal step in the
proper direction—will only mitigate the harms caused by trolls that reach the trial
level.164 Copyright trolls’ actual objectives embodied within infringement suits
clearly have diverged from the idea of delivering justice through defending digital
rights. Rather, they have become focused instead on procuring unenforced copyrights
that are being allegedly infringed upon in order to acquire a discovery order.165 Thus,
the actual effect of these noxious firms’ activities results in undermining the primary
policy goals of the Copyright Act by chilling free speech and disincentivizing
innovation.166 As a result, copyright trolls’ primary aim of simply reaching the
pretrial discovery stage has remained intact, and has paved the way for a new and
more perspicacious troll to learn vicariously.167

163 Broad. Music, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 544 (court extensively reviewed established precedent to
articulate factors to examine statutory damages); see also Original Appalachian Artworks, 658 F.
Supp. at 465 (citing Rodgers v. Eighty Four Lumber Co., 623 F. Supp. 887 (W.D. Pa. 1985); Rare
Blue Music, Inc. v. Guttadauro, 616 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Mass. 1985); and Milene Music, Inc. v.
Gotauco, 551 F. Supp. 1288 (D.R.I. 1982)).
164 See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 152, at 500–01 n.307 (“It is fairly common for
judges to recite a set of factors that should be considered in awarding statutory damages. This has
not, however, necessarily led to soundly reasoned analyses about the level of award that was
appropriate given the harm to the plaintiff.”); see also Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, 302 F.
Supp. 2d 455, 461 (D. Md. 2004) (instructing jury on a number of factors to consider in awarding
statutory damages, including the defendant’s wealth); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 799
F. Supp. 2d 999, 1001 (D. Minn. 2011) (The court reduced the statutory damages award in a filesharing case because the amount awarded for copyright infringement for personal use was
“appalling.”).
165 See Tehranian, supra note 9, at 550 (“One can readily imagine a future dystopian world
where the record labels, long since irrelevant to the development and distribution of new music,
become nothing more than copyright trolls, drawing their revenue entirely from collections (or
litigation) of this kind.”).
166 Id. at 549. Professor Tehranian explains:

The expanded enforcement of copyright laws precipitated by the P2P revolution
has forced us to reexamine the rationality of our reigning intellectual property
regime. For example, the statutory damages provisions of the Copyright Act have
enabled the RIAA to file multimillion dollar infringement suits against thousands
of individuals, including many children and grandparents, on the basis of P2P
activity. The cases rarely advance to an adjudication on the merits, as all but the
bravest (or, perhaps, most foolhardy) defendants quickly settle instead of fighting
the well-financed behemoth and the powerful threat of statutory damages—up to
$ 150,000 per infringing act.
Id.

167 See Anderson, supra note 153 (emphasizing that US anti-P2P firms have applied the
Recording Industry Association of America’s strategy of mass-litigation and will continue to grow
“with no one in Congress standing up to publicly denounce the tactics.”); Malibu Media, LLC, v.
Assigned Ip Address 24.183.51.58, No. 13-cv-205-wmc, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128615, at *9 (W.D.
Wis. Sept. 10, 2013) (reasoning that, when Malibu Media was ordered to show cause why the court
should not issue Rule 11(b) sanctions, “[w]hile the court agrees with Malibu Media that there is only
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A new sophisticated troll can effortlessly circumvent the existing precedent
established by troll cases, specifically Righthaven and Prenda Law’s Fair Use,
standing, fraudulence, and ethics rulings. It can become more efficacious than its
fallen predecessors by actually acquiring the exclusive bundle of rights afforded to
copyright owners of illegally-downloaded online media, as done by Malibu Media.168
Even though courts are beginning to recognize the “false positives” concern regarding
the actual identity of the alleged infringer, this tends to only arise at the trial
level.169 Further, as technology develops and further erodes privacy rights, the risk
of “false positives” may even disappear as the actual identities of alleged infringers
become increasingly more available. This would compound the troll issue through
hyper-enforcement of the Copyright Act.170
B. The “Procedural Pause Button” Approach
This is a problem requiring a solution because the merits of Fair Use, standing,
and the probability of false positives as prevailing defenses were only a pretext to an
excessive enforcement issue that will continue to propagate.171 In order to ultimately
circumstantial evidence of ill intent, Malibu Media’s denials do not pass the smell test, and any
denial of improper motive by its counsel does not pass the laugh test.”).
168 Compare Righthaven LLC v. Wehategringos.com, No. 2:10-CV-01457-LRH-GWF, 2012 WL
693934, at *2–3 (D. Nev. Mar. 1, 2012); Righthaven LLC v. Eiser, No. 2:10-cv-3075-RMG-JDA, 2012
WL 527571, at *17–21 (D.S.C. Jan. 13, 2012) (finding Righthaven lacked standing because it did not
own the exclusive rights afforded protection under copyright law because Righthaven was assigned
the bare right to sue under the agreement made with various news publishers), with Malibu Media,
LLC v. Does, No. 12-2078, 2013 WL 3038025, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 18, 2013) (Malibu Media owns the
valid copyrights registered with the United States Copyright Office), and Malibu Media, LLC v.
Does, No. 12-2078, 2013 WL 30648, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2013) (noting that “the Fields founded
Malibu Media, LLC . . . Brigham Field agreed to transfer all of his copyrights to the company. In an
Affidavit, Colette Field attests that her and her husband’s intentions were always for Malibu Media
to acquire “every single right associated with” Brigham Field’s copyrights.”).
169 AF Holdings LLC v. Doe, 2013 WL 97755, at *20 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2013) (court denied
plaintiff leave to amend complaint because there were no facts showing that the defendant infringed
AF Holdings’ copyrighted material “apart from the facts . . . that the IP connection through which
the material was downloaded [was] registered to Hatfield.”); AF Holdings LLC v. Rogers, No.
12cv1519 BTM(BLM), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11929, at *4–5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2013) (recognizing
the issue of false positives); In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, No. 113995(DRH)(GRB), 2012 WL 1570765, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2012) (emphasizing the “risk of false
positives gives rise to the potential for coercing unjust settlements from innocent defendants such as
individuals who want to avoid the embarrassment of having their names publicly associated with
allegations of illegally downloading.”); Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1–176, 279 F.R.D. 239, 242 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
170 See Tehranian supra note 9, at 550 (“As surveillance technology grows more sophisticated,
thereby allowing acts of infringement increasingly to come under the detection and enforcement
power of copyright holders, we will be forced to confront the law/norm disparity.”).
171 Id. at 549. Tehranian forecasts that:
[B]y facilitating superior tracking of the use of copyrighted works, technology is
now forcing us to address the uncomfortable and ultimately untenable law/norm
disparity. While there may be a vast disparity between what activities the
Copyright Act proscribes and what the average American might consider fair or
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halt the disingenuous efforts of trolls disguised as digital rights defenders before the
identities of innumerable alleged infringers are subpoenaed from ISPs and
settlement letters are disbursed, the Copyright Act must be amended to prevent this
form of chilling litigation.172 To prevent this misuse of the discovery stage by
copyright trolls, a “procedural pause button” must be established. This “pause
button” should be incorporated into the Copyright Act to provide for a limited
evidentiary hearing, as opposed to notice pleading.173 At the hearing, there will be an
assessment geared to establish bad faith through an objective constellation of
nonexclusive factors.174
First, it should be specific to cases where non-author plaintiffs or rights holders
evince troll tactics by generating an ancillary revenue stream through excessive
enforcement while seeking to obtain the identities of large groups of alleged
infringers from ISPs at the discovery stage.175 Courts can identify these trolls by
ordering non-author parties seeking copyright enforcement to provide sufficient
evidence of actual ownership of the copyright. At the same time, it can expose any
improper purpose, discovery abuse,176 or copyright misuse from both author and non-

just, a lack of aggressive enforcement has long prevented this fundamental
tension from coming to a head. As technology improves, however, and as privacy
rights continue to erode, enforcement is becoming increasingly practicable.
Id.

172 See, e.g., Pallante supra note 151, at 9 (stressing the revision of the Copyright Act because
the “dissemination of content is so pervasive to life in the 21st century, copyright issues are
necessarily pervasive as well—from fair use in education to statutory licenses for new businesses, to
the parameters of liability and enforcement online and in the home”); Righthaven LLC v. Jama, No.
2:10–cv–1322–JCM–LRL, 2011 WL 1541613, at *13 (D. Nev. Apr. 22, 2011) (Righthaven’s “litigation
strategy has a chilling effect on potential fair uses of Righthaven-owned articles, diminishes public
access to the facts contained therein, and does nothing to advance the Copyright Act’s purpose of
promoting artistic creation.”).
173 FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (Federal courts used a much stricter standard called “fact pleading
standard” until the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938, which allows parties
drafting pleadings to state their claims in general terms without alleging detailed facts to support
each claim and without worrying about hypertechnical details.).
174 See e.g., Pallante supra note 151, at 5, 14 (suggesting the Copyright Act should be revised
because there comes a time when the “subject ought to be dealt with as a whole, and not by further
merely partial or temporizing amendments” while raising the issue of “whether Congress should
create a streamlined adjudicative process to assist copyright owners with claims of small economic
value”).
175 See, e.g., Kurt Opsahl, EFF Moves to Quash Subpoena in Copyright Troll’s Retaliatory
Lawsuit, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 18, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/04/eff-movesquash-subpoena-copyright-trolls-retaliatory-lawsuit (noting that Prenda Law has successfully
subpoenaed the identities of tens of thousands of potential online infringers during the discovery
stage to mass-mail settlement letters).
176 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g). By signing a disclosure, or discovery request, response, or objection,
the following occurs:

[A] party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and
belief formed after a reasonable inquiry: . . . (B) with respect to a discovery
request . . . it is: (i) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or
by a nonfrivolous argument . . . [and is] (ii) not interposed for any improper
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author plaintiffs.177 Courts would then be able to inexpensively expose trolls before
an inundation of legal ransom letters are disbursed. Any bad faith intent of the nonauthor plaintiffs would be revealed at the preliminary stage. Meanwhile, countless
defendants will be safeguarded against receiving meritless settlement letters that
force them to pay the high costs of litigation to defend against claims that should
never have reached discovery, let alone settlement.178
Second, courts will be able to identify whether the defendant has plausible noninfringement arguments by applying the principles extracted from precedent as
discussed in Part II during the limited evidentiary hearing.179 Before extortionate
settlement letters can be mailed, courts will be presented with the opportunity to
require parties to offer concrete proof of the online infringement associated with the
account holder in question. This will include requiring rights holders to find
alternative ways to more precisely identify the alleged infringer without creating
collateral damage.180
purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the
cost of litigation.
Id.
177

See, e.g., Pallante supra note 151, at 6. Pallante conceded that
Congress is acting responsibly when it makes discrete adjustments to the
copyright law from time to time, but its more valuable role always has come from
reviewing, and addressing as appropriate, the larger policy themes and
developments that require attention. . . . The next great copyright act would not
require Congress to start from scratch because, since 1998, it has put in motion a
steady stream of preparatory work on core issues.

Id.; see also Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that the
copyright misuse defense may be extended to instances where “the copyright is being used in a
manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright”).
178 See, e.g., Pallante supra note 151, at 30 (identifying that “1976 Act, which was a fair and
remarkable achievement by many accounts, did not come close to the bleeding edge of technology”
displayed by its “inadequacies [that] are already becoming apparent, and no prophet is needed to
foretell the need for substantial restructuring of our copyright system before the end of this
century”).
179 See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 152, at 501–02. Samuelson suggests principles
that illustrate what courts should do when awarding copyright statutory damages:
[1)] Consider awarding the reduced minimum damages authorized for “innocent”
infringements in close fair use cases or . . . cases in which the noninfringement
claim was strong, even if [not ultimately successful; (2)] . . . Award the minimum
statutory damages award [available] in cases of ordinary infringement when: [(a)]
the plaintiff lost no profits and the defendant made no profits from the
infringement, or when damages and profits are nominal or minimal; [(b)] the
infringement was technical in nature; (c) the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s lawyer has
engaged in misconduct; or (d) the defendant had a plausible fair use or other
noninfringement argument (unless the plaintiff’s lost profits or defendant’s profits
justify a larger award.
Id.

180 AF Holdings LLC v. Rogers, No. 12cv1519 BTM(BLM), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11929, at *4–
5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2013). The Court recognized that under FED. R. CIV. 11(b)(3):
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Third, in order to elect statutory damages resulting from a download, courts
should compel plaintiffs to supply more than a modicum of evidence that actual
damages is difficult to measure.181 The plaintiffs will have a more difficult time
pleading statutory, rather than actual, damages. In effect, the risk that IP address
subscribers will receive a meritless settlement claim is minimized by placing a
heavier but not undue burden on plaintiffs seeking copyright enforcement against
large numbers of John Does in online infringement cases.
Applying all the factors above, the limited evidentiary hearing will act as a
reasonableness standard for the courts to distinguish a legitimate author seeking
enforcement from an illegitimate non-author seeking extortion.182 This procedural
pause button would minimize the abuse of copyright remedies, limit the joinder of
John Doe defendants, and protect their identities, all while restoring the original
intent and policy-backed considerations instilled in the Act by the framers.183

Plaintiff’s counsel certified that to the best of his knowledge, this factual
contention has evidentiary support. However, due to the potential for abuse in
these types of cases, the Court wants to make sure that Plaintiff’s contention is
supported by evidence that goes beyond the identity of the subscriber to the IP
address. Therefore, the Court orders Plaintiff to provide a more definite
statement setting forth the factual basis for its allegation that Defendant used IP
address 68.8.137.53 to infringe its copyright.
Id.

181 Id. at 502 (stressing that in cases of online infringement, the courts should require the
parties to “offer proof of damages and profits, or, in the alternative, to demonstrate why damages or
profits are sufficiently difficult to prove that it is justifiable to offer no such proof”).
182 Memorandum & Order at 10, Third Degree Films v. Does 1–47, No. 12-10761-WGY (D.
Mass. Oct. 2, 2012). The Court explained:

Since its decision was issued in Liberty Media, this Court has entertained a
profusion of filings in the mass copyright infringement cases on its docket. Upon
further reflection and deeper understanding of the policy considerations at play,
the Court now revisits and amends its holding in Liberty Media. The Court
continues to maintain that joinder is technically proper under Rule 20(a). The
Court now holds, however, that in light of its serious concerns regarding prejudice
to the defendants as a result of joinder, it ought exercise the broad discretion
granted it under 20(b) and sever the Doe defendants in this action and in similar
actions before this Court.
Id.; see also Memoranum & Order at 9, Third Degree Films v. Does 1–72, No. 12-10760-FDS (ECF
No. 28) (D. Mass. Nov. 5, 2012) (dismissing and severing numerous John Doe defendants in the
interests of justice and judicial economy); Disc. Video Ctr., Inc. v. Does 1–29, No. 12-10805-NMG, at
10–11 (D. Mass. Nov. 7, 2012) (No. 31) (denying expedited discovery in consolidated order regarding
three independent cases due to the plaintiff’s inability to create a discovery plan); Order at 2, West
Coast Prods. v. Does 1–535, No. 3:10-cv-00094-JPB-JES (N.D. Va. Dec. 16, 2010) (ECF No. 45)
(severing all John Doe defendants except one because “merely committing the same type of violation
in the same way does not link defendants together for purposes of joinder” while quashing all
subpoenas).
183 See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 152, at 451–52.
Congress made several changes in the new statutory damage regime that were
intended to curb the potential for excessively large awards and strengthen the
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CONCLUSION
Even though ethical investigations and class action lawsuits resulted in
Righthaven and Prenda Law’s insolvencies, the incentive for trolls remains, as
vividly displayed by Malibu Media. Analogous to the patent system, copyright trolls
will continue to unravel the fabric of intellectual property enforcement as long as the
Copyright Act creates a profit for this behavior.
The ramifications of their litigation tactics under current law diverge from the
framers’ underlying purpose of the Act.184 According to Maria Pallante, Register of
Copyrights of the United States and Director of the U.S. Copyright Office,
Congress needs to see the evolution of technology and related businesses
with some objectivity, and to consider, as appropriate, the rulings and the
frustrations of the courts, before it can move forward. When it is ready to
move, however, Congress should do so with both great deference to the
principles of the past and great vision for the future.185
Pallante further encourages “Congress not only to think about copyright law but to
think big. The next great copyright act is as exciting as it is possible. Most
importantly, it is a matter of public interest.”186 Accordingly, the Copyright Act must
be amended in order to bridge the exploited gap between online user behavior and
the protections afforded to rights holders. This will restore the incentive to
“stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”187

compensatory purposes of such awards; yet, it also created a new higher range for
statutory damages that could be awarded against willful infringers, which
unfortunately opened up opportunities for excessive awards far beyond
congressional intent.
Id.
184

See Tehranian, supra note 9, at 549–50. Tehranian explains that:
The P2P example is just one way in which technology has enabled expanded
enforcement of copyright laws—a trend that is accelerating as technology
improves. Imagine a world where every act currently deemed infringing under
the law were actually prosecuted. . . . The very technologies that enhance our
media experiences are rapidly bringing us closer to the Panopticon state in which
a near-total enforcement of intellectual property rights becomes viable.

Id.

185 See Pallante supra note 151, at 1, 5 (addressing the need for the “next great copyright act”
because there comes a time when the “subject ought to be dealt with as a whole, and not by further
merely partial or temporizing amendments”).
186 Id. at 30.
187 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).

